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Abstract
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mech-
anism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced
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more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post
individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of
satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Since achieving efficiency through a dominant strat-
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our results illustrate the limits of this impossibility.
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1 Introduction
How should a group of agents allocate a unit of resource among themselves? For instance,
consider the problem of allocating a bequest among a group of potential heirs. Many a
times, no will exists. Even when a will exists, disputes arise. Designated estate agents are
often employed to resolve bequest related problems. A Wall Street Journal article quotes an
expert suggesting the following dispute resolution procedure:
In family disputes, Ms. Olsavsky says, one option is to have all the items put up
for auction. Family members can bid on what they want. The money goes back
to the estate to be divided equally (Coombs, 2013).
There are a number of other examples: a group of firms sharing time slots on a jointly
owned supercomputer (Guo et al., 2011); a group of municipalities deciding on the location
of a stadium (Cramton et al., 1987). A key feature of these problems is that transfers can be
used (either as taxes or subsidies) for resource allocation. However, transfers across agents
have to balance - money raised by auctioning a bequest must be redistributed among the
heirs. 1
We design mechanisms for such problems with the aim of achieving efficiency. Efficiency
requires one to allocate the bequest to the highest valued heir or to allocate the world cup
venue to the country which benifits the most from hosting the event. In the standard private
values model, where each agent has a value for the unit of resource/object and transfers are
allowed with quasilinear utility, the Vickrey auction satisfies three compelling desiderata of a
mechanism: (a) dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), (b) (allocative) efficiency
- allocating the object to the highest valuation agent, and (c) ex-post individual rationality.
A well-known criticism of the Vickrey auction is that it is not budget-balanced - it collects
revenue from the agents, which distorts ex-post efficiency. Green and Laffont (1979) shows
that this criticism applies to every DSIC and efficient mechanism: no DSIC and efficient
mechanism can be budget-balanced. We look for a second-best solution, where we explore
the limits of this impossibility result:
1Commenting on the recent controversy surrounding the allocation of soccer World cup venue, Rakesh
Vohra in the popular blog The Leisure of the Theory Class writes: Instead of running beauty contests to
decide where to hold FIFA events, auction off the right to the highest bidder. This can be done in two ways.
Allow each FIFA official with a vote to auction off their vote to the highest bidder. Or, do away with the
officials altogether and have countries bid directly for the right to hold FIFA events. Full transparency, no
bribery and FIFA may be richer than before! (Vohra, 2015) Just like the bequest settlement case, FIFA must
redistribute the transfers collected from the countries among them.
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How close to efficiency can we get using a DSIC and budget-balanced mechanism?
We require our solution to satisfy symmetry - agents with identical valuation must get the
object with equal probability and pay the same amount. Symmetry is a compelling fairness
property - for instance, in the bequest allocation problem, an asymmetric mechanism may
either be unacceptable to potential heirs or lead to unpleasant lawsuits later on.
We identify a class of DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mechanisms that we call
ranking mechanisms. A ranking mechanism is one that uses a ranking allocation rule, which
is specified (for n agents) by n numbers (pi1, . . . , pin) between 0 and 1 such that they add up
to not more than 1 and pij ≥ pij+1 for each j. For every j, the number pij is the probability
with which an agent with the j-th highest value is allocated the object at any generic profile
of values. Our main result is a description of the r-optimal mechanism - a DSIC, budget-
balanced, and symmetric ranking mechanism that beats every such mechanism in terms of
the allocation probability to the highest valuation agent.
At every profile of values, our r-optimal mechanism allocates the object to the highest
valued agent with more than 99% probability, provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also
ex-post individually rational. The welfare generated by the r-optimal mechanism converges
to efficiency as the number of agents increase. The nature of convergence is shown in Table
1, where we report on the probability with which the highest valued agent gets the object in
our mechanism.
No of agents Probability to the highest valued agent
9 92.3%
10 95%
11 96.2%
12 98.1%
13 98.9%
14 99.4%
15 99.6%
16 99.8%
17 99.9%
Table 1: Convergence in our mechanism
The r-optimal mechanism we identify satisfies ex-post individual rationality. Ex-post
individual rationality is a desired property of mechanisms. Consider politicians across mu-
nicipalities or countries, involved in procuring a public facility or negotiating the venue of
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an international sporting event. Failure to get the facility or the event would result in crit-
icisms. The criticism would be compounded if in addition to a failure, payments also have
to be made. Political opponents could well allege corruption.
Ranking mechanisms contain two familiar DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mech-
anisms: (i) the mechanism that allocates the object to each agent with equal probability
without using any transfers and (ii) the residual claimant mechanism in Green and Laf-
font (1979). The residual claimant mechanism is defined by choosing an agent uniformly at
random as a residual claimant and conducting a Vickrey auction among the other agents.
The revenue generated from the auction is then given to the residual claimant. We refer to
this mechanism as the Green-Laffont (GL) mechanism, and note that at profiles of distinct
values, it allocates the object to the highest valued agent with probability 1−1/n and to the
second highest valued agent with probability 1/n. 2 Our r-optimal mechanism coincides with
the GL mechanism if the number of agents is no more than 8 but differs from it significantly
for more than 8 agents.
Our analysis is prior-free. We use DSIC as our solution concept. As we discuss later
in Section 5, Cramton et al. (1987) show that Bayesian incentive compatible, efficient, and
budget-balanced mechanisms satisfying a form of individual rationality exists in our model.
While the mechanism they propose require information about beliefs of agents (with com-
mon prior assumption), our result shows the level of efficiency that can be achieved using
DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms, thus showing the limits of such a prior-free and
robust approach in this problem. Inspired by the seminal work of Bergemann and Morris
(2005), recent literature in mechanism design has been investigating such questions in other
models (Chung and Ely, 2007; Carroll, 2015). 3
In view of the Green and Laffont impossibility result, comparing efficiency levels of two
DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mechanisms is a natural question. The notion we use
here compares ranking mechanisms by the probability with which the highest valued agent
gets the object. Formally, we show that this notion coincides with a worst-case measure of
efficiency: the worst-case ratio of welfare generated by a ranking mechanism and efficient
2This mechanism (and its variants) were discussed in the context of public-good provision problem in
Green and Laffont (1979). Later, Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000) formally define this mechanism and study
its statistical and strategic properties.
3There are two recent papers which also provide foundational results of DSIC mechanisms in the private
values single object auction environment. Manelli and Vincent (2010) show that in such models, for every
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there is an “equivalent” DSIC mechanism - this equivalence is in
terms of interim expected utility of agents. This result is extended to other settings in Gershkov et al. (2013).
Unlike our work, these papers do not impose budget-balance as a constraint - indeed, these equivalence results
do not hold if budget-balance constraint is imposed.
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level of welfare. In a prior-free environment, such worst-case measures give a very robust
method of comparing mechanisms. These measures are widely used to compare algorithms
in the computer science literature, and in the algorithmic game theory literature (Cavallo,
2006; Guo and Conitzer, 2009). They are also becoming popular in the mechanism design
literature (Chung and Ely, 2007; Moulin, 2009; Carroll, 2015; Masso´ et al., 2015).
From a technical point, our paper extends the Myersonian approach. Recall that Myerson
(1981) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be DSIC. 4 We extend
his characterization to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be DSIC,
budget-balanced, and symmetric. One of the surprising corollaries of this characterization is
that if there is a DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mechanism using an allocation rule,
then it is the only such mechanism using this allocation rule. A consequence of this result
is that the search over the domain of DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mechanisms
can be confined to the domain of allocation rules satisfying our necessary and sufficient
conditions - we do not have to worry about payments since they are identified uniquely.
Our characterization reveals a rich but complex class of such mechanisms. The ranking
mechanisms that we consider in this paper are much simpler to describe. The separation of
payment and allocation decisions gives us a lot of tractability in the class of ranking allocation
rules, where we derive our mechanism and show its constrained optimality. Though we do
not know if we can improve upon our r-optimal mechanism, by considering more complex
mechanisms, the overwhelming speed of convergence of our mechanism (as shown in Table 1)
implies that we may not be losing out much by restricting attention to ranking mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2. We
introduce ranking mechanisms and discuss our main results in Section 3. We give a technical
characterization of DSIC, budget-balanced, and symmetric mechanisms in Section 4. We
relate our results to the literature in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. All the omitted
proofs are relegated to an Appendix at the end. To keep the proofs of our results lucid, we
present them in a different sequence than the sequence in which corresponding results appear
in the main text. Hence, we recommend that the proofs be read after reading the main text.
2 The Model
We consider the standard single object independent private values model withN = {1, . . . , n}
as the set of agents. Throughout, we assume that n ≥ 3 - the n = 1 case is trivial and the
4His characterization is for Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms, but can be straightforwardly
adapted to DSIC mechanisms.
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n = 2 case is discussed later. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation vi for the object. If he is
given αi ∈ [0, 1] of the object, or given the object with probability αi, and he pays pi for it,
then his net utility is αivi− pi. The set of all valuations for any agent is given by V ≡ [0, β],
where β ∈ R. A valuation profile will be denoted by v ≡ (v1, . . . , vn).
An allocation rule is a map f : V n → [0, 1]n, where we denote by fi(v) the probability
of agent i getting allocated the object at valuation profile v. We assume that at all v ∈ V n,∑
i∈N fi(v) ≤ 1.
A payment rule of agent i is a map pi : V
n → R. A collection of payment rules of all
the agents will be denoted by p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn). A mechanism is a pair (f,p). We require
our mechanism to satisfy the following three properties:
• A mechanism (f,p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for
every i ∈ N , for every v−i ∈ V n, and for every vi, v′i ∈ V , we have
vifi(vi, v−i)− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vifi(v′i, v−i)− pi(v′i, v−i).
• A mechanism (f,p) is budget-balanced (BB) if for every v ∈ V n, we have∑
i∈N
pi(v) = 0.
• A mechanism (f,p) is symmetric if for every v ∈ V n and for every i, j ∈ N with
vi = vj, we have
fi(v) = fj(v), pi(v) = pj(v).
We call a mechanism satisfactory if it is DSIC, BB, and symmetric. 5 Symmetry
allows us to consider a mild notion of fairness in our mechanism. It also explicitly rules out
dictatorial mechanisms, where a dictator agent is given the object for free at all valuation
profiles. 6
An allocation rule f is satisfactorily implementable if there exists a p such that (f,p)
is a satisfactory mechanism. We are interested in finding satisfactory mechanisms that are
almost efficient in the following sense.
5Green and Laffont (1977) use the terminology satisfactory mechanism to mean something different.
Among other things, their satisfactory mechanisms are DSIC and efficient but need not be BB and symmetric.
We apologize if this creates a confusion.
6A weaker version of symmetry would be to consider anonymity of the mechanism with respect to net
utilities of the agents - see Sprumont (2013) for a formal definition. We will require our stronger version of
symmetry for our main result.
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At any valuation profile v, denote by v[k] the set of agents who have the k-th highest
valuation at v. More formally,
v[1] := {i ∈ N : vi ≥ vj ∀ j ∈ N}.
Having defined v[k − 1], we recursively define v[k] as
v[k] := {i ∈ N \ (∪k−1k′=1v[k′]) : vi ≥ vj ∀ j ∈ N \ (∪k−1k′=1v[k′])}.
Definition 1 An allocation rule f is efficient at v if∑
i∈v[1]
fi(v) = 1.
An allocation rule f is efficient if it is efficient at all v ∈ V n. A mechanism (f,p) is efficient
if f is efficient.
The efficiency of a BB mechanism is equivalent to maximizing the total welfare of agents
at every profile of valuations. To see this, note that the total welfare of agents at a valuation
profile v from a mechanism (f,p) is∑
i∈N
[
vifi(v)− pi(v)
]
=
∑
i∈N
vifi(v),
where the second equality followed from BB. This is clearly maximized by assigning the
object to the highest valued agents.
Green and Laffont (1979) show that no DSIC and budget-balanced mechanism can be
efficient. Hence, a satisfactory mechanism cannot be efficient. The precise question we are
interested in is: what is the “most” efficient satisfactory mechanism?
2.1 A Prior-Free Notion to Measure Efficiency
In view of the Green-Laffont result, we adopt one of the well-known notions to measure
efficiency of satisfactory mechanisms. Fix a satisfactory mechanism M ≡ (f,p). Note that
at any valuation profile v with v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, the maximum possible (efficient) social welfare
is v1, and the social welfare achieved by M is∑
i∈N
vifi(v).
The ratio of these two numbers is a good measure of efficiency at the valuation profile v.
More precisely, the number
f1(v) +
1
v1
(∑
i 6=1
vifi(v))
)
,
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is a measure of efficiency at the valuation profile v. Here, as in the rest of the paper, we
assume 0
0
= 1. Note that such a measure only depends on f and not on p because (f,p) is a
budget-balanced mechanism. Now, the worst-case of this ratio happens when we minimize
this over all v. In particular, for a satisfactory mechanism M ≡ (f,p), the worst-case
efficiency is given by
µM = inf
v
[
f1(v) +
1
v1
(∑
i 6=1
vifi(v))
)]
.
A natural objective is to find a satisfactory mechanism that maximizes this worst-case
efficiency. As discussed in the introduction, this is a robust method of comparing efficiency
of mechanisms. We apply this notion of comparing efficiency levels of mechanisms in a
restricted class of mechanisms that we describe next.
3 Ranking Mechanisms
In most of the paper, we focus attention on the following class of simple allocation rules and
the corresponding satisfactory mechanisms that can be constructed using such allocation
rules. We call them ranking allocation rules. Each ranking allocation rule is defined by n
numbers (pi1, . . . , pin) with each pii ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i∈N pii ≤ 1. Informally, at a generic valuation
profile v1 > v2 > . . . > vn, for every k, pik reflects the probability with which agent k (which
has rank k at this profile) gets the object. Notice that this probability does not change across
valuation profiles as long as the rank of the agent does not change. This feature makes the
ranking allocation rules simple, both from the point of view of practical implementation and
analysis. Also, we require every ranking allocation rule to be symmetric, and this means
that it allocates the object in a particular way when there are ties in valuations. We clarify
this tie-breaking by formally defining the ranking allocation rule first.
Definition 2 An allocation rule f is a ranking allocation rule if it is symmetric and there
exists numbers pii ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N with pi1 ≥ . . . ≥ pin and
∑
i∈N pii ≤ 1 such that at
every valuation profile v and every k ∈ N , we have∑
i∈∪kj=1v[j]
fi(v) =
∑
i∈∪kj=1v[j]
pii.
A mechanism (f,p) is a ranking mechanism if f is a ranking allocation rule.
To illustrate the tie-breaking, suppose there are seven agents: N = {1, . . . , 7} and consider
a valuation profile v such that v1 = v2 > v3 = v4 = v5 > v6 > v7. Consider a ranking
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allocation rule (pi1, . . . , pi7). According to the definition, agents 1 and 2 will equally share
(due to symmetry) the allocation probabilities (pi1 + pi2), i.e., each agent gets the good with
probability pi1+pi2
2
. Then, agents 3, 4, and 5 will equally share the allocation probabilities
(pi3 + pi4 + pi5). Finally, agents 6 and 7 get allocation probabilities pi6 and pi7 respectively.
Note that breaking ties in this manner in a ranking allocation rule maintains continuity
of total welfare in terms of valuations of agents. For instance, consider the valuation profile
discussed in the above example. Consider any arbitrarily close generic (with distinct valua-
tions for agents) valuation profile to this valuation profile. The total expected value of agents
1 and 2 in this profile is arbitrarily close to v1pi1 + v2pi2 = v1(pi1 + pi2), where the equality
follows from the fact that v1 = v2. Hence, we can maintain continuity of total welfare by
giving a total of (pi1 +pi2) probability to agents 1 and 2. Finally, using symmetry, we equally
divide this probability among these two agents. This explains the tie-breaking in the ranking
allocation rule.
Even though the ranking allocation rule is a simple class of allocation rules, there is a
rich subclass of ranking allocation rules that are satisfactorily implementable. Our focus on
this class is purely driven by their tractability and simplicity.
Two well-known ranking allocation rules are satisfactorily implementable. The equal-
sharing allocation rule, where each agent gets the object with probability 1
n
is satisfactorily
implementable - no transfers are required for this. The other allocation rule comes from a
mechanism proposed by Green and Laffont. Pick an agent i uniformly at random. Run a
Vickrey auction among the remaining N \ {i} agents. Give the revenue from the Vickrey
auction to agent i. Since agents are treated symmetrically, the Vickrey auction is DSIC, and
by construction, the mechanism is budget-balanced. 7
A closer look at the Green-Laffont mechanism reveals the following. For valuation profiles
with a distinct highest valued agent, it allocates the object to him with probability (1−1/n)
and shares the remaining probability 1/n among the second highest valued agents. For
valuation profiles with more than one highest valued agents, it allocates the entire object
equally among the highest valued agents. Therefore, given Definition 2, the allocation rule
used in the Green-Laffont mechanism is a ranking allocation rule, where
pi1 = 1− 1/n, pi2 = 1/n, pi3 = . . . = pin = 0.
7Green and Laffont (1979) discuss an even larger class of satisfactory mechanisms where they take out
a coalition of “residual claimant” agents with some probability, run the Vickrey auction on the remaining
agents, and allocate the revenue of the Vickrey auction to the residual claimants equally. These mechanisms
are also ranking mechanisms.
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To be precise, this is the allocation rule corresponding to the direct mechanism of the Green-
Laffont mechanism.
We now characterize the ranking allocation rules that can be satisfactorily implemented.
Notation: For any two non-negative numbers K and K ′ with K ≥ K ′, we denote by
C(K,K ′) the number of ways we can choose K ′ agents from a set of K agents.
Proposition 1 A ranking allocation rule with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin) is satisfactorily im-
plementable if and only if
n∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)pik = 0.
Later, in Theorem 4, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a general allocation
rule f to be satisfactorily implementable. Those necessary and sufficient conditions are
complicated - they involve verifying an infinite system of equations. On the other hand, the
necessary and sufficient condition for satisfactorily implementing a ranking allocation rule is
a single equation given by Proposition 1. This hints that it may be tractable to search over
the space of ranking allocation rules.
Now, we adapt our notion of efficiency measure by restricting the class of mechanisms to
ranking mechanisms.
Definition 3 A ranking allocation rule (pi1, . . . , pin) is r-optimal if it satisfactorily imple-
mentable and for any other satisfactorily implementable ranking allocation rule (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n),
we have
pi1 ≥ pi′1.
A ranking mechanism (f,p) is r-optimal if (i) (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism and (ii)
f is r-optimal.
The notion of r-optimality is an indirect way of requiring a mechanism to maximize the
value of worst-case efficiency in the class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. To see this, fix
a ranking mechanism M≡ (f,p) with allocation probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin). Note that
µM = inf
v
[
pi1 +
1
v1
(∑
j 6=1
pijvj
)]
= pi1 + inf
v
1
v1
(∑
j 6=1
pijvj
)
= pi1,
where we used the fact that infimum of the above expression occurs when each agent j 6= 1
has zero valuation.
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Later, in Theorem 4, we shall establish the fact that if f is satisfactorily implementable,
then there is a unique p such that (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism. As a result, we
shall only talk about the r-optimality of an allocation rule - the corresponding r-optimal
mechanisms are uniquely defined.
3.1 The Main Result
In this section, we provide our main result, which identifies an r-optimal allocation rule. To
do so, we first propose a general class of ranking allocation rules. In this generalization, at a
generic valuation profile, the top ranked agent is given the object with some probability pi1
and agents ranked 2 to ` are given the object with equal probability pi2, where pi1+(`−1)pi2 =
1. Formally, a two-step allocation rule is defined as follows.
Definition 4 A two-step ranking allocation rule is a ranking allocation rule with prob-
abilities
(pi1, pi2, . . . , pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`−1
, 0, . . . , 0),
where pi1 > pi2 > 0 and pi1 + (`− 1)pi2 = 1.
Hence, a two-step allocation rule is uniquely defined by (pi1, `) - ` is the number of agents
receiving positive probability. The GL allocation rule is a two-step ranking allocation rule
with pi1 = 1− 1/n and ` = 2. In Proposition 5 (see Appendix), we characterize the class of
two-step ranking allocation rules that can be satisfactorily implemented - this class requires
` to be even and pi1 is determined uniquely given an even value of `.
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper. It shows that there is a two-step
ranking allocation rule that is r-optimal, which has excellent convergence to efficiency.
Theorem 1 There is a two-step ranking allocation rule that is r-optimal. Its allocation
probabilities (pi∗1, . . . , pi
∗
n) are defined as follows:
pi∗i =

1− `−1
C(n−2,`−1)+` if i = 1
1
C(n−2,`−1)+` if i ∈ {2, . . . , `}
0 otherwise,
where
` ∈ arg min
2≤i≤(n−1), i even
(i− 1)(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) .
Moreover, if n 6= 8, there is a unique r-optimal allocation rule.
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Remark 1. Though Theorem 1 requires at least three agents, we can easily identify the
r-optimal mechanism in the two-agent case. Proposition 1 continues to hold even if n = 2.
As a result, the only ranking allocation rule that can be satisfactorily implemented are those
where both the agents get the object with equal probability. Hence, the unique r-optimal
allocation rule is the equal sharing allocation rule where both the agents get the object with
probability 1/2 - transfers are not needed to make this allocation rule satisfactorily imple-
mentable.
Remark 2. All our optimality results rely on the fact that the valuation space V of each
agent is rich - an interval with zero as the lowest valuation. We do not know how to extend
these results to a setting where V is an arbitrary interval. However, we stress here that the
mechanism we derive in Theorem 1 remains valid for any arbitrary interval V . To see this,
consider V := [L,H], where 0 ≤ L < H. Note that our results along with the mechanism
in Theorem 1 hold true if valuation space is [0, H]. Now, consider the restriction of this
mechanism to the valuation space [L,H] - such a restriction is well-defined and satisfactory.
Thus, our mechanism will have the same efficiency properties when V := [L,H]. Of course,
this mechanism need not satisfy the optimality property claimed in Theorem 1 - though,
we have no counter-examples to show this. In fact, we conjecture that our mechanism will
remain optimal even in such type spaces.
3.2 Computations
Besides the optimality of the two-step allocation rule identified in Theorem 1, we want to
stress the speed with which it converges to efficiency. Because of combinatorial terms in the
denominator of the expression for pi∗1, its convergence to 1 is exponential. We spell out the
exact nature of this convergence below.
The exact form of the r-optimal allocation rule will depend on the value of n. Note that
the value of ` is determined by minimizing the following expression over all even i ≤ (n− 1):
min
2≤i≤(n−1), i even
(i− 1)(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) .
Routine calculations show that the minimum of this expression occurs when i = 2 for n < 8.
Hence, for n < 8, the GL allocation rule is the unique r-optimal allocation rule.
If n = 8, the minimum of this expression occurs at i = 2 or i = 4. If n ≥ 9, the maximum
value of C(n − 2, i − 1) over all even i determines the minimum of this expression - it is
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possible that two values of i maximizes C(n− 2, i− 1), in which case we choose the smaller
one to minimize i−1
C(n−2,i−1)+i .
Hence, the choice of ` in Theorem 1 is unique for all values of n 6= 8. In the proof of
Theorem 1, we show that as long as we can choose ` uniquely, the r-optimal allocation rule
is unique.
We now consider the case n ≥ 9 and give an explicit formula for ` in this case. Denote
by bxce and bxco respectively the largest even number smaller than x and the largest odd
number smaller than x. We now consider two cases.
Case 1. If n is odd, then n − 2 is odd. So, C(n − 2, i − 1) is maximized at two values of
i− 1: at n−2+1
2
or n−2−1
2
, out of which one of them is odd. So, we can say C(n− 2, i− 1) is
maximum when i− 1 = bn−1
2
co or i = bn+12 ce.
Case 2. If n is even, then C(n− 2, i− 1) is maximum when i− 1 = n−2
2
. Since we require
(i − 1) to be odd, we can say that i − 1 = bn−2
2
co or i = bn2 ce. Since n is even, we can
equivalently write this as i = bn+1
2
ce.
Hence, when n ≥ 9, we conclude that ` in Theorem 1 is bn+1
2
ce. We document this as a
corollary.
Corollary 1 The two-step ranking r-optimal allocation rule identified in Theorem 1 sat-
isfies
` = 2 if n < 8,
` ∈ {2, 4} if n = 8,
` = bn+ 1
2
ce if n ≥ 9.
Hence, for n < 8, the GL allocation rule is the unique r-optimal allocation rule.
Corollary 1 shows that for n = 8, there are many r-optimal allocation rules. For ` = 2
and ` = 4, we have two two-step ranking allocation rules that are r-optimal. Any convex
combination of these two allocation rules will also be r-optimal. Note that ranking rules
generated by such convex combinations need not be two-step ranking allocation rules. In
conclusion, for n 6= 8, we have a unique r-optimal allocation rule defined by Theorem 1.
But for n = 8, the uniqueness is lost and there exists r-optimal allocation rules that are not
two-step ranking allocation rule.
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Corollary 1 allows us to compute the allocation probabilities of the highest valuation agent
using the Pascal triangle in Figure 1. Each row (starting with the second row) represents a
particular value of n, starting with n = 3 in the second row. By Corollary 1, ` = 2 if n < 8,
` ∈ {2, 4} if n = 8, and ` = bn+1
2
ce if n > 9. In each row of the Pascal triangle, the entries
are C(n− 2, 0), C(n− 2, 1), . . . , C(n− 2, n− 2). Now, the value C(n− 2, `− 1) is highlighted
in the orange (lighter shaded) cell of each row. 8 The probability of the highest valuation
agent is then easily computed from this and the value of ` as: C(n−2,`−1)+1
C(n−2,`−1)+` , which is shown
to the right of the Pascal triangle.
Note that for n ≥ 14, the object is allocated to the highest valuation agent with at least
99% probability. The Green-Laffont allocation rule will require at least 100 agents to achieve
such probability for the highest valuation agent.
Figure 1: The r-optimal allocation rule
8The values in the brown (darker shaded) cells correspond to the entries of the Green-Laffont allocation
rule.
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3.3 Participation Constraints
We now show that a strong form of participation constraint is satisfied by a class of ranking
mechanisms, including the r-optimal mechanism in Theorem 1.
Definition 5 A mechanism (f,p) is ex-post individually rational if for every i ∈ N
and for every v, we have
vifi(v)− pi(v) ≥ 0.
The ex-post notion of participation constraint is appropriate in our prior-free model.
Notice that, unlike the model in Cramton et al. (1987), our model does not have any property
rights defined for the agents. 9 Hence, we assume that the outside option of each agent is
zero. In that sense, even though our participation constraints are ex-post, they only ensure
non-negative payoff from participation. On the other hand, the participation constraints in
Cramton et al. (1987) is interim but because of the property rights structure, they ensure
larger interim payoffs to agents.
We prove below that a class of mechanisms using two-step ranking allocation rules satisfy
ex-post individual rationality. For n ≥ 8, the two extremes of this class are the Green-Laffont
mechanism and our r-optimal mechanism in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Suppose f is a two-step ranking allocation rule defined by (pi1, `), where 2` ≤
n+ 1. If (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism, then it is ex-post individually rational.
The r-optimal allocation rule in Theorem 1 satisfies the sufficient condition identified in
Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose f is the r-optimal allocation rule identified in Theorem 1. If (f,p)
is a satisfactory mechanism, then it is ex-post individually rational.
Proof : By Corollary 1, the r-optimal allocation rule in Theorem 1 satisfies 2` ≤ n+ 1. By
Theorem 2, the claim follows. 
We compute the payments in the mechanisms discussed in Theorem 2. While the general
payment formula for a satisfactory mechanism is quite complicated (see Theorem 4), the
payment formula for the mechanisms in Theorem 2 is easier to express.
9We discuss the results in Cramton et al. (1987) in details in Section 5.
15
Notation. For any pair of positive integers, K,K ′ with K ≥ K ′,
ψ(K ′, K) := K ′ × (K ′ + 1)× . . .×K
Proposition 2 Suppose (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism, where f is a two-step ranking
allocation rule defined by (pi1, `) with pi1 + (` − 1)pi2 = 1. For any valuation profile v with
v1 > v2 > . . . > vn > 0, we have
• if i = 1, then
pi(v) = − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=1
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
.
• if i ∈ {2, . . . , `}, then
pi(v) = − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ i−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k−1)!ψ(n−`, n−k−1)vk+
`−1∑
k=i
(−1)k(k−1)!ψ(n−`, n−k−1)vk+1
]
.
• if i > `, then
pi(v) = − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk + (−1)`(`− 1)!v`
]
.
In any two step ranking allocation rule (pi1, `), at a valuation profile v with v1 > v2 >
. . . > vn > 0, an agent i with i > ` gets the object with zero probability - call such agents
losing agents. According to the payment formula computed in Proposition 2, losing agents
receive some payments. Theorem 2 shows that losing agents receive non-negative payment
if 2` ≤ n + 1. Hence, participation constraints are satisfied for losing agents in such class
of mechanisms. For two step ranking allocation rules, where 2` > n + 1, it is possible that
losing agents may be asked to pay, violating their participation constraint.
3.4 Pareto Optimal Ranking Mechanisms
We now discuss an alternate prior-free notion of comparing mechanisms, where we compare
mechanisms at every valuation profile in term of total social welfare. Informally, a satisfac-
tory mechanism M dominates another satisfactory mechanism M′ if M generates as much
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total welfare as M′ in every profile of valuations and strictly higher in some profile of val-
uations. A satisfactory mechanism is Pareto optimal if it is not dominated by any other
satisfactory mechanism.
It is a relatively weak notion to compare mechanisms - for instance, it may be that a
Pareto optimal mechanism is dominated by another satisfactory mechanism at a positive
measure of valuation profiles. Two satisfactory mechanisms may not even be comparable
using this notion.
We adapt the notion of Pareto optimality to the class of ranking mechanisms.
Definition 6 A ranking allocation rule f is r-Pareto optimal if (i) f is satisfactorily
implementable and (ii) there does not exist another ranking allocation rule f ′ such that f ′ is
satisfactorily implementable and at every valuation profile v, we have∑
i∈N
vif
′
i(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
vifi(v),
with strict inequality holding at some v.
A ranking mechanism (f,p) is r-Pareto optimal if (i) (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism
and (ii) f is r-Pareto optimal.
We first show that the GL allocation rule is an r-Pareto optimal allocation rule.
Theorem 3 The GL allocation rule is an r-Pareto optimal allocation rule. Moreover, it is
the unique r-Pareto optimal allocation rule satisfying pi3 = . . . = pin = 0.
Theorem 3 gives a foundation for the GL mechanism. Among all ranking mechanisms
that only allocate the object to top-two agents, the GL mechanism is the unique r-Pareto
optimal mechanism. As we show in the next result, if n ≤ 8, the GL mechanism is the
unique r-Pareto optimal mechanism, but there are other r-Pareto optimal mechanisms if the
number of agents is greater than 8. In particular, our r-optimal mechanism is always r-Pareto
optimal.
Proposition 3 For n ≤ 8, the GL allocation rule is the unique r-Pareto optimal allocation
rule. For n > 8, the unique r-optimal allocation rule identified in Theorem 1 is also r-Pareto
optimal. Further, for any arbitrary r-Pareto optimal allocation rule (pi1, . . . , pin), we have
1− 1/n ≤ pi1 ≤ pi∗1,
where pi∗1 is as defined in Theorem 1.
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4 Satisfactory Implementability
In this section, we provide a characterization that drives all our main results. In particular,
we provide a complete characterization of allocation rules which can be satisfactorily imple-
mented. Besides the technical aspect, there are other reasons why such a characterization
is useful: (1) it provides a recipe for carrying out such analysis of satisfactory mechanisms
in other models and (2) it showcases the rich but complex class of non-ranking mechanisms
that are satisfactory, thus, highlighting the salience of ranking mechanisms.
Before stating the characterization, we remind the reader about the following character-
ization of DSIC mechanisms by Myerson. 10
Lemma 1 (Myerson (1981)) A mechanism (f,p) is DSIC if and only if
• Montonicity of f . for every i ∈ N , for every v−i ∈ V n−1, and for every vi, v′i ∈ V
with vi > v
′
i, we have
fi(vi, v−i) ≥ fi(v′i, v−i).
• Revenue Equivalence. for every i ∈ N , for every v−i ∈ V n−1, and for every vi ∈ V ,
we have
pi(vi, v−i) = pi(0, v−i) + vifi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
For any mechanism M ≡ (f,p), we define UMi (v) as the net utility of agent i at valuation
profile v:
UMi (v) = vifi(v)− pi(v).
A consequence of the Myersonian characterization of DSIC is the following characterization
of DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms.
Proposition 4 A mechanism M ≡ (f,p) is DSIC and budget-balanced if and only if
1. for every i ∈ N , for every v−i ∈ V n−1, and for every vi, v′i ∈ V with vi > v′i we have
fi(vi, v−i) ≥ fi(v′i, v−i).
2. for every i ∈ N , for every v−i ∈ V n−1, for every vi ∈ V , we have
UMi (vi, v−i) = UMi (0, v−i) +
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
10The characterization in Myerson is for Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. However, it is straight-
forward to extend it to DSIC mechanisms.
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3. for every v ≡ (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V n,∑
i∈N
UMi (0, v−i) =
∑
i∈N
[
vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
]
.
Proof : From Lemma 1, (1) and (2) are equivalent to DSIC. For (3), note that budget-
balance of a mechanism M ≡ (f,p) requires that for all v ≡ (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V n, we must
have ∑
i∈N
UMi (v) =
∑
i∈N
vifi(v).
Using (2), we conclude that a DSIC mechanism is budget-balanced if and only if for all
v ≡ (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V n,∑
i∈N
UMi (0, v−i) +
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi =
∑
i∈N
vifi(v).
Equivalently, a DSIC mechanism M ≡ (f,p) is budget-balanced if and only if for all v ≡
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V n, ∑
i∈N
UMi (0, v−i) =
∑
i∈N
[
vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
]
.

Our main characterization, like Myerson’s characterization, provides a way to separate
out the allocation rule and the payment rule in a satisfactory mechanism. While Myerson
does not impose budget-balance, our result shows that this separation continues to hold even
if we impose budget-balance.
Fix an allocation rule f . If f is monotone (in the sense of Lemma 1), then we can
immediately define a payment scheme p that makes (f,p) DSIC as follows: for every i ∈ N
and for every v, set
pi(v) = vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
Note that pi(0, v−i) = 0 for all i and for all v−i in this mechanism. We call a mechanism
defined from such a payment scheme as the elementary mechanism corresponding to a
monotone f . It can be easily verified that if f is the efficient allocation rule, then the
corresponding elementary mechanism is the Vickrey auction.
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For every valuation profile v, define for every i ∈ N , the payment of agent i in the
elementary mechanism corresponding to a monotone f as:
Rfi (v) := vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
Then,
Rf (v) :=
∑
i∈N
Rfi (v),
denotes the total revenue collected at valuation profile v in the elementary mechanism cor-
responding to f .
We will provide necessary and sufficient conditions on f for it to be satisfactorily im-
plementable. These conditions are given in terms of revenue collected from the elementary
mechanism corresponding to f at various valuation profiles.
At any valuation profile v, define N0v := {i ∈ N : vi = 0}. Given any valuation profile v,
for any T ⊆ N , we denote by (0T , v−T ) the valuation profile where all the agents in T have
zero valuation and each agent i /∈ T has valuation vi.
Definition 7 An allocation rule f is residually balanced if for every v such that N0v = ∅,
we have ∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T | Rf (0T , v−T ) = 0. (1)
Residual balancedness is a technical combinatorial condition on an allocation rule. We
show that for a symmetric and monotone allocation rule residual balancedness is necessary
and sufficient for satisfactory implementability.
Theorem 4 A symmetric allocation rule f is satisfactorily implementable if and only if it
is (a) monotone and (b) residually balanced.
Further, if f is satisfactorily implementable, then there is a unique p such that (f,p) is a
satisfactory mechanism. Such a unique p is defined as follows: for all v ∈ V n, for all i ∈ N ,
pi(v) = − 1|N0v|
∑
T⊆N :N0v⊆T
(−1)|T\N0v|
C(|T |, |N0v|)
Rf (0T , v−T ) if i ∈ N0v
pi(v) = R
f
i (v)−
1
|N0v|+ 1
∑
T⊆N :(N0v∪{i})⊆T
(−1)|T\N0v|−1
C(|T |, (|N0v|+ 1))
Rf (0T , v−T ) if i /∈ N0v
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The condition in Theorem 4 looks very similar to the cubical array lemma in Walker
(1980). While the cubical array lemma applies to only efficient allocation rule, our char-
acterization is for any allocation rule. Theorem 2 in Yenmez (2015) characterizes ex-post
incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanisms. 11 His characterization is a charac-
terization of DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms, and hence, still uses transfers. On the
other hand, the advantage of our characterization is that it gives necessary and sufficient
condition on the allocation rule to be satisfactorily implementable. Thus, we are able to
separate out allocation rule and payments for analyzing budget-balanced mechanisms.
The proof of Theorem 4 is in the Appendix. It is notationally quite complex. Here, we
illustrate the idea of the necessity part with an example of three agents: N = {1, 2, 3}. Let
f be a symmetric, monotone, and satisfactorily implementable allocation rule. Then, there
is a p such that (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism. Consider a valuation profile v ≡ (0, 0, 0).
By BB and symmetry, we get p1(v) = p2(v) = p3(v) = 0. Now, consider a valuation profile
v ≡ (v1, 0, 0). By Lemma 1,
p1(v) = p1(0, 0, 0) +R
f
1(v) = R
f
1(v).
Note that Rf (v) = Rf1(v). By symmetry p2(v) = p3(v). Hence, by BB and symmetry,
0 = p1(v) + 2p2(v) = 2p2(v) +R
f (v).
This implies that
p2(v1, 0, 0) = −1
2
Rf (v1, 0, 0).
Now, consider a valuation profile v ≡ (v1, v2, 0). Using BB and Lemma 1, and following the
above arguments, we get
p1(v) = p1(0, v2, 0) +R
f
1(v) = −
1
2
Rf (0, v2, 0) +R
f
1(v)
p2(v) = p2(v1, 0, 0) +R
f
2(v) = −
1
2
Rf (v1, 0, 0) +R
f
2(v)
Adding these two with p3(v) and using BB, we get
p3(v1, v2, 0) =
1
2
(
Rf (v1, 0, 0) +R
f (0, v2, 0)
)
−Rf (v1, v2, 0).
11His solution concept is ex-post incentive compatibility because he looks at a setting that can potentially
allow for interdependent valuations.
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Finally, consider the valuation profile (v1, v2, v3) with v1, v2, v3 > 0. Again, using Lemma 1,
we get
p1(v) = p1(0, v2, v3) +R
f
1(v) =
1
2
(
Rf (0, v2, 0) +R
f (0, 0, v3)
)
−Rf (0, v2, v3) +Rf1(v)
p2(v) = p2(v1, 0, v3) +R
f
2(v) =
1
2
(
Rf (v1, 0, 0) +R
f (0, 0, v3)
)
−Rf (v1, 0, v3) +Rf2(v)
p3(v) = p3(v1, v2, 0) +R
f
2(v) =
1
2
(
Rf (0, v2, 0) +R
f (v1, 0, 0)
)
−Rf (v1, v2, 0) +Rf3(v)
Adding and using BB, we get
Rf (v1, v2, v3)−Rf (v1, v2, 0)−Rf (0, v2, v3)−Rf (v1, 0, v3)+Rf (v1, 0, 0)+Rf (0, v2, 0)+Rf (0, 0, v3) = 0,
which is the residual balancedness condition. The sufficiency can be shown using the explicit
form of payment functions hidden in these calculations. In summary, residual balancedness
allows a recursive calculation of payments at all valuation profiles so that budget-balance
holds.
5 Relation to the Literature
The impossibility of achieving efficiency, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and
budget-balance was first shown by Green and Laffont (1979), which also contains a lot
of discussions on achieving second-best using non-efficient but DSIC and budget-balanced
mechanisms. This includes the Green-Laffont mechanism that we discuss. Though, they fo-
cussed attention on public good problems and gave sketches of the Green-Laffont mechanism
we discuss, they clearly anticipated the mechanism as well as many environments beyond the
public good problem where the impossibility result would hold. Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane
(2000) contains an extensive discussion on this - they also formally define the Green-Laffont
mechanism and study its statistical and strategic properties in the public good problem.
This impossibility result started a long literature on how to overcome it. We classify
them in several categories and discuss some relevant ones. Most of the literature we discuss
concern with private good allocation among several buyers. There are parallel literature on
bilateral trading and public good provision that we do not discuss.
Domain identification. Classic revenue equivalence results imply that every efficient
and DSIC mechanism must be a Groves mechanism (Green and Laffont, 1977; Holmstro¨m,
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1979). The Green-Laffont impossibility result essentially implies that no Groves mechanism
can balance budget in many settings - though their focus is mainly of public good problems.
In the public good context, Laffont and Maskin (1980) consider differentiable mechanisms
and show that existence of a DSIC, BB, and efficient mechanism is equivalent to solving a
system of differential equations. In the same model, Walker (1980) identifies domains (of
utility functions of agents) where impossibilities exist - he restricts attention to continuous
mechanisms. As corollary of their results, they identify form of utility functions of agents
where possibility or impossibility result exists. Hurwicz and Walker (1990) extend the Green-
Laffont impossibility to pure exchange economies. These papers are mainly focused on
identifying domains where the negative result of Green and Laffont persists.
But there are settings where DSIC, BB, and efficient mechanisms exist. Suijs (1996) is
a good example of a domain where Groves mechanisms that balance the budget exists - he
discusses a sequencing problem. In the context of multi-object assignment, a recent contribu-
tion is Mitra and Sen (2010). This paper identifies domains of multi-object auctions where
the Green-Laffont impossibility can be overcome.
Bayesian incentive compatibility. One way to get around the Green-Laffont impossi-
bility is to consider the weaker solution concept of Bayesian incentive compatibility. Arrow
(1979); d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) construct Bayesian incentive compatible, ef-
ficient, and budget-balanced mechanism, now known as the dAGV mechanism, that work in
a variety of settings. The dAGV mechanisms fail to be interim individually rational in many
settings. In an unpublished paper, Fudenberg et al. (1995) extend this result in the following
sense - for every Bayes-Nash implementable allocation rule, there exists a Bayesian incentive
compatible and budget-balanced mechanism using this allocation rule. Like in the dAGV
mechanism, such budget-balanced mechanisms need not satisfy interim individual rational-
ity. Rahman (2011) gives a characterization of Bayesian (and ex-post) incentive compatible
and budget-balanced mechanisms in a very general framework.
In a seminal paper, Cramton et al. (1987) show that efficient, Bayesian incentive com-
patible, budget-balanced mechanisms satisfying interim individual rationality is possible in
a single object allocation problem. 12 The possibility result in our problem using Bayesian
incentive compatibility is in sharp contrast to the impossibility results known in bilateral
trading problems like in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Unlike Cramton et al. (1987), we focus on DSIC mechanisms, and our mechanism is not
12They consider a problem where agents have property rights over the object, and stronger form of interim
individual rationality is satisfied by their mechanism. However, their results can still be applied to our
problem if we assume equal property rights to all the agents.
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efficient. Naturally, the mechanism in Cramton et al. (1987) require a lot of prior informa-
tion. Our mechanism is prior-free and satisfies ex-post individually rationality. Thus, we
illustrate a prior-free way of approximately achieving the possibility result in Cramton et al.
(1987).
Redistribution mechanisms. The prior-free approach of mechanism design using DSIC
mechanisms have been popular in algorithmic game theory literature in computer science.
Restricting attention to efficient mechanisms, which means restricting attention to Groves
mechanisms, several papers relax budget-balance and show how best to redistribute the sur-
plus revenue. The measure of efficiency of redistribution is worst-case in these papers. One
of the earliest papers to do this is Cavallo (2006), who studied this problem in our setting
(single object allocation). He showed that remarkable Groves mechanisms exist that can
redistribute large fraction of Vickrey auction payments using Groves mechanisms. Moulin
(2009) and Guo and Conitzer (2009) derive optimal redistribution mechanisms in the multi-
unit allocation setting where agents demand exactly one unit - their mechanisms are identical
and discovered independently. 13 As the number of agents increase, like our mechanism, their
Groves mechanisms can redistribute large fraction of Vickrey auction revenue among agents.
The main difference from these papers and ours is budget-balance. Since these papers do
not impose budget-balance, the actual budget imbalance in these mechanisms can be high in
various valuation profiles. On the other hand, like in Cramton et al. (1987), budget-balance
is a constraint in our problem. Hence, unlike these papers, we work with mechanisms outside
the Groves class. Our results show that we can achieve excellent levels of efficiency (99%
with at least 14 agents) using DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms.
Beyond Groves mechanisms. While most of the literature seems to have either weak-
ened DSIC to Bayesian incentive compatibility or relaxed the budget-balanced criteria while
working with efficient and DSIC mechanisms (Groves mechanisms), there is very little lit-
erature on exploring the limits of DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms. We do this for
the case of single object allocation problem. One of the problems with exploring non-Groves
mechanisms is that we search over the space of allocation rules and payment rules - Groves
mechanisms pin down the allocation rule to be the efficient allocation rule. A non-efficient al-
location rule can achieve better social welfare redistribution is well known - see for instance
examples in Laffont and Maskin (1980) and a more computational analysis in de Clippel
13Several papers related to this theme have also appeared - see for instance, Apt et al. (2008) and Moulin
(2010).
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et al. (2009). Sprumont (2013) consider Pareto-undominated mechanisms by considering
DSIC and non-efficient mechanisms, though his mechanisms are not budget-balanced. Falt-
ings (2005) and Guo et al. (2011) consider variants of Green-Laffont mechanisms discussed
in Green and Laffont (1979) and show some worst-case results, but they do not consider
the general class of DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms that we analyze. Hashimoto
(2015) discusses a non-ranking satisfactory mechanism and provides several axiomatization
his mechanism.
Another possibility is to consider priors and design the expected welfare maximizing
DSIC and budget-balanced mechanism for allocating an object. This is similar to the ex-
pected revenue maximizing question in Myerson (1981), but significantly more complicated.
Restricting attention to the case of two agents and deterministic mechanisms, Drexl and
Kleiner (2015) derive the optimal expected welfare maximizing DSIC and budget-balanced
mechanism. Shao and Zhou (2013) do the same analysis for two agents but without requiring
budget-balance. These papers illustrate difficulty in extending such analysis to more than
two agents. In that sense, we provide a prior-free method of measuring welfare of mechanisms
which turns out to be tractable for any number of agents.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel DSIC, budget-balanced, symmetric, and ex-post individually
rational mechanism to allocate a single unit of a resource. The mechanism converges to
efficiency with moderately high number of agents. Further, the mechanism can be viewed
as a generalization of the Green-Laffont mechanism. From a methodological standpoint, we
provide several key insights on how to analyze DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms, and
propose a tractable class of mechanisms that we call ranking mechanisms.
While we carry out this analysis for allocating a single unit of resource, we feel that the
ideas in this paper can be pushed in other models of mechanism design where budget-balance
is a constraint. Further, an indirect implementation of our mechanism will significantly
improve the practicality of our proposed mechanism.
From a broader perspective, our results quantify the impossibility on designing DSIC,
budget-balanced, and efficient mechanisms in the single object allocation problem. It shows
that even though impossibility exists, it is really thin. Thus, the possibility results with
Bayesian incentive compatibility (Cramton et al., 1987) or approximate possibility results
with relaxed budget-balanced constraints (Guo and Conitzer, 2009; Moulin, 2009) can also
be approximately achieved with DSIC and budget-balanced mechanisms.
25
Appendix: Omitted Proofs
This section contains all the missing proofs. We first prove our workhorse result - Theorem
4. Once this result is proved, we use it to prove Proposition 1. Then, we proceed to prove
our two main results - Theorem 3 and Theorem 1. Then, we prove our individual rationality
result - Theorem 2.
Notations. We will need some extra notations. At every valuation profile v and for every
k ∈ N , we denote by v(k) the valuation of every agent in v[k]. Note that for some k ∈ N ,
it is possible that v[k] = ∅, in which case v(k) is defined to be 0. For any j ∈ N , let the
cardinality of the set ∪jh=1v[h] be Lj.
We illustrate these notations with an example. Suppose N = {1, . . . , 8}. Consider
a valuation profile v such that v[1] = {1, 2}, v[2] = {3, 4, 5, 6}, and v[3] = {7, 8}. Then,
L1 = 2, L2 = 6, L3 = 8. According to a ranking allocation rule with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pi8),
agents 1 and 2 share pi1 + pi2 equally, agents 3, 4, 5, 6 share pi3 + pi4 + pi5 + pi6 equally and
agents 7 and 8 share pi7 + pi8 equally. In other words, for every j ∈ N , agents in v[j] share
equally the probabilities
piLj−1+1 + . . .+ piLj ,
where L0 ≡ 0.
We begin by a lemma, which will be useful to all our proofs.
Lemma 2 Suppose f is a ranking allocation rule. Then, Rf is continuous.
Proof : For any v, we know that
Rf (v) =
∑
i∈N
vifi(v)−
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
We now do the proof in two steps. Assume that the allocation probabilities of the ranking
allocation rule are pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ . . . ≥ pin.
Step 1. In this step, we show that for every i ∈ N , the expression ∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi is
continuous in v. Fix a valuation profile v. Consider agent i and suppose i ∈ v[j]. Hence,
vi ≡ v(j) for some j. Then, using the definition of the ranking allocation rule, we note that∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi =
∫ v(j)
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
= piLj(v(j) − v(j+1)) + piLj+1(v(j+1) − v(j+2)) + . . .
=
∑
h≥j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1)).
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To establish continuity, we look at a valuation profile v′ which is arbitrarily close to v, and
v′ and v differ in valuation of only agent k - it is enough to look at valuation profiles that
differ in one component. Suppose k ∈ v[`]. If ` < j, then there is nothing to prove since the
above summation is unchanged from v to v′. Hence, assume ` ≥ j. Since v′ is arbitrarily
close to v, it must be that k ∈ v′[`] (this happens if v′k > vk) or k ∈ v′[` + 1] (this happens
if v′k < vk). Indeed, since v
′ is arbitrarily close to v, it must be that {k} = v′[` + 1] or
{k} = v′[`]. We consider both the cases separately. We denote the cardinality of the set
∪rh=1v′[h] by L′r for all r. Note that if {k} = v[`] (i.e., if k is the only element in v[`]), then
Lr = L
′
r for all r. As a result,∫ v′i
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi =
∑
h≥j
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
→
∑
h≥j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1))
=
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
So, the claim is true. Hence, we assume |v[`]| > 1. Now, consider the following two cases.
Case 1-a. Suppose {k} = v′[`]. Since |v[`]| > 1, v′(`) = v′k → vk = v(`) = v′(`+1). Then,
L′r = Lr for all r < ` and L
′
r = Lr−1 for all r > `. Further, v
′
(r) = v(r) for all r < ` and
v′(r) = v(r−1) for all r > `. As a result,∫ v′i
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi =
∑
h≥j
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
=
`−1∑
h=j
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1)) + piL′`(v′(`) − v′(`+1)) +
∑
h≥`+1
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
→
`−1∑
h=j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1)) +
∑
h≥`+1
piLh−1(v(h−1) − v(h))
=
`−1∑
h=j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1)) +
∑
h≥`
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1))
=
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
This shows that
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi →
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi as v′k → vk.
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Case 1-b. Suppose {k} = v′[` + 1]. Since |v[`]| > 1, we have v′(`) = v(`). This implies that
v′(`+1) = v
′
k → vk = v(`) = v′(`).
Here, we need to worry about the case k = i. If k = i, then i ∈ v′[` + 1]. Further, for
every r ≥ `+ 1, we have L′r = Lr−1 and for every r > `+ 1, we have v′(r) = v(r−1).∫ v′i
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi =
∑
h≥`+1
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
= piL′`+1(v
′
(`+1) − v′(`+2)) +
∑
h>`+1
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
→ piL`(v(`) − v(`+1)) +
∑
h>`+1
piLh−1(v(h−1) − v(h))
=
∑
h≥`+1
piLh−1(v(h−1) − v(h))
=
∑
h≥`
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1))
=
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
This shows that
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi →
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi as v′i → vi.
A similar proof works if k 6= i. Then, L′r = Lr for all j < ` and L′r = Lr−1 for all r > `.
Further, v′(r) = v(r) for all r < ` and v
′
(r) = v(r−1) for all r > `. As a result,∫ v′i
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi =
∑
h≥j
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
=
`−1∑
h=j
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1)) + piL′`(v′(`) − v′(`+1)) +
∑
h≥`+1
piL′h(v
′
(h) − v′(h+1))
→
`−1∑
h=j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1)) +
∑
h≥`+1
piLh−1(v(h−1) − v(h))
=
`−1∑
h=j
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1)) +
∑
h≥`
piLh(v(h) − v(h+1))
=
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
This again shows that
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v
′
−i)dxi →
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi as v′k → vk.
Step 2. Now, we argue that the summation
∑
i∈N vifi(v) is continuous. Fix a valuation
profile v. Consider all the j-th ranked valuation agents, v[j], for some j. Note that the total
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sum of welfare of agents in v[j] is
v(j)
(
piLj−1+1 + . . .+ piLj
)
,
where L0 ≡ 0. Hence, the total welfare of all agents is
n∑
j=1
v(j)
(
piLj−1+1 + . . .+ piLj
)
.
For any other valuation profile arbitrarily close to v, agents in v[j] will (a) have valuations
arbitrarily close to v(j) and (b) their ranks (in the valuation profile) will be from Lj−1 + 1 to
Lj. As a result, their total welfare is arbitrarily close to
v(j)
(
piLj−1+1 + . . .+ piLj
)
.
Applying this argument to every j, we get that for any valuation arbitrarily close to v, the
total welfare of agents is arbitrarily close to
n∑
j=1
v(j)
(
piLj−1+1 + . . .+ piLj
)
=
∑
i∈N
vifi(v).
Steps 1 and 2 show that Rf is continuous in v. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof : Suppose f is a symmetric allocation rule which is satisfactorily implementable. This
implies that there exists a symmetric p such that the mechanism M ≡ (f,p) is satisfactory.
By Proposition 4, f is monotone. The remainder of the claims we do in steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that for every v ∈ V n such that N0v 6= ∅, we have for every
i ∈ N0v,
UMi (v) =
1
|N0v|
∑
T⊆N :N0v⊆T
(−1)|T\N0v|
C(|T |, |N0v|)
Rf (0T , v−T ).
We show this using induction. If |N0v| = n, then budget-balance implies that
∑
i∈N UMi (v) =
0. Symmetry implies that UMj (v) = UMk (v) for all j, k ∈ N at this valuation profile. Hence,
UMi (v) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Since v ≡ 0N , we have Rf (v) = 0. Hence, the claim is true for
N0 = N .
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Suppose the claim is true for all valuation profiles v¯ such that |N0v¯| > |N0v|. Let K ≡ N0v.
Since M is DSIC and budget-balanced, by Proposition 4, we get
Rf (v) =
∑
i∈N
UMi (0, v−i) =
∑
i∈K
UMi (0, v−i) +
∑
i/∈K
UMi (0, v−i)
=
∑
i∈K
UMi (0K , v−K) +
∑
i/∈K
UMi (0K∪{i}, v−(K∪{i}))
= |K|UMj (0K , v−K) +
∑
i/∈K
UMi (0K∪{i}, v−(K∪{i})) (where j is some agent in K)
= |K|UMj (0K , v−K) +
1
|K|+ 1
∑
i/∈K
∑
T⊆N :(K∪{i})⊆T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, (|K|+ 1))R
f (0T , v−T ),
where the third equality followed from symmetry and the final equality followed from the
induction hypothesis. The summation in the last line of the above sequence of expressions
can be simplified as follows:∑
i/∈K
∑
T⊆N :(K∪{i})⊆T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, (|K|+ 1))R
f (0T , v−T )
=
∑
T⊆N :K(T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, (|K|+ 1))(|T \K|) R
f (0T , v−T )
=
∑
T⊆N :K(T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, |K|) (|K|+ 1) R
f (0T , v−T ).
To understand why the first equality works, note that for every T ⊆ N such that K ⊆ T ,
the summation will come for all i ∈ T \K. Hence, it will appear (|T \K|) times.
Using the above equations in the earlier expression, we get that for all j ∈ K,
UMj (0K , v−K) =
1
|K|R
f (v) +
1
|K|
∑
T⊆N :K(T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|) R
f (0T , v−T )
=
1
|K|R
f (0K , v−K) +
1
|K|
∑
T⊆N :K(T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|) R
f (0T , v−T )
=
1
|K|
∑
T⊆N :K⊆T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|) R
f (0T , v−T )
This proves the claim.
Step 2. Now consider any valuation profile v. By Proposition 4, we see that for every agent
i ∈ N ,
pi(v) = R
f
i (v)− UMi (0, v−i).
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Using Step 1 in this equation gives us the desired expression for pi(v).
Step 3. Finally, we show that f is residually balanced. Consider any type profile v such
that N0v = ∅. Then, using Step 2, for every i ∈ N ,
pi(v) = R
f
i (v)−
∑
T⊆N :i∈T
(−1)|T |−1
|T | R
f (0T , v−T ).
Hence, we get
0 =
∑
i∈N
pi(v) = R
f (v) +
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N :i∈T
(−1)|T |
|T | R
f (0T , v−T )
= Rf (v) +
∑
T⊆N :T 6=∅
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T )
=
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ).
This shows that f is residually balanced. This concludes one direction of our proof.
For the other direction, suppose f is a symmetric allocation rule that is monotone and
residually balanced. Consider p defined in the statement of this theorem. Clearly, p is
symmetric since f is symmetric. Hence, M ≡ (f,p) is a symmetric mechanism. Further, for
every agent i ∈ N and every valuation profile v, we get
UMi (vi, v−i) = vifi(vi, v−i)−Rfi (vi, v−i) + UMi (0, v−i),
where we have used the expression for pi(v) to substitute it with R
f
i (v)− UMi (0, v−i) in the
above expression. This gives us
UMi (vi, v−i) = UMi (0, v−i) +
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi.
This along with the monotonicity of f implies M is DSIC (Proposition 4).
Finally, we show that M is budget-balanced. To do so, consider a valuation profile v.
We consider two cases.
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Case 1. N0v 6= ∅. Let K ≡ N0v. Now,∑
i∈N
pi(v) =
∑
i∈K
pi(v) +
∑
i/∈K
pi(v)
=
∑
i∈K
[
Rfi (v)−
1
|K|
∑
T⊆N :K⊆T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|)R
f (0T , v−T )
]
+
∑
i/∈K
[
Rfi (v)−
1
|K|+ 1
∑
T⊆N :(K∪{i})⊆T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, (|K|+ 1))R
f (0T , v−T )
]
= Rf (v)−
∑
T⊆N :K⊆T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|)R
f (0T , v−T )
−
∑
i/∈K
[
1
|K|+ 1
∑
T⊆N :(K∪{i})⊆T
(−1)|T\K|−1
C(|T |, (|K|+ 1))R
f (0T , v−T )
]
= Rf (v)−
∑
T⊆N :K⊆T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|)R
f (0T , v−T )
+
[ ∑
T⊆N :K(T
(−1)|T\K|
C(|T |, |K|)R
f (0T , v−T )
]
= Rf (v)−Rf (0K , v−K)
= 0.
Note that budget-balance followed without any extra conditions in this case.
Case 2. N0v = ∅. In that case,∑
i∈N
pi(v) = R
f (v) +
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N :i∈T
(−1)|T |
|T | R
f (0T , v−T )
= Rf (v) +
∑
T⊆N :T 6=∅
(−1)|T | Rf (0T , v−T )
=
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T | Rf (0T , v−T )
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that f is residually balanced.
This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we give a proof of Proposition 1. We extensively use Theorem 4 to prove
our result. Before starting our proofs, we explicitly compute the Rf values for any ranking
allocation rule f . A valuation profile v is called 0-generic if for all i 6= j with vi = vj we
have vi = vj = 0.
We start off with the following claim.
Lemma 3 Suppose f is a ranking allocation rule with allocation probabilities pi ≡ (pi1, . . . , pin).
Then, for every 0-generic valuation profile v, we have
Rf (v) =
n−1∑
j=1
jv(j+1)(pij − pij+1),
where v(k) = 0 if v[k] = ∅ for any k.
Proof : Choose a 0-generic valuation profile v. Consider agent i ∈ N with vi > 0. Since v is
a 0-generic valuation profile, {i} = v[j] for some j. If j = n, then vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi =
0. So, consider j < n. As a result
vifi(v)−
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi = pijv(j) −
∫ v(j)
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
= pijv(j) −
n∑
h=j
pih(v(h) − v(h+1)) (Note: v(n+1) ≡ 0.)
=
n∑
h=j+1
v(h)(pih−1 − pih).
This implies that
Rf (v) =
n−1∑
j=1
n∑
h=j+1
v(h)(pih−1 − pih)
=
n−1∑
j=1
jv(j+1)(pij − pij+1).

Using Lemma 3, we will now give a proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof : Let f be a ranking allocation rule with allocation probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin). Note
that f is monotone in the sense of Myerson. By Theorem 4, we know that f is satisfactorily
implementable if and only if for every v with v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn > 0, we have∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) =
n∑
k=0
∑
T⊆N :|T |=n−k
(−1)n−kRf (0T , v−T ) = 0.
Since Rf is continuous (Lemma 2), it is enough to show the above equality for 0-generic valu-
ation profiles. In other words, continuity of Rf implies that f is satisfactorily implementable
if and only if for every v with v1 > v2 > . . . > vn > 0, we have∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) =
n∑
k=0
∑
T⊆N :|T |=k
(−1)kRf (0T , v−T ) = 0.
Note that for every T ⊆ N , the profile (0T , v−T ) is a 0-generic valuation profile. We can
divide this sum into two parts.∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) =
∑
T⊆N :n∈T
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) +
∑
T⊆N :n/∈T
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T )
Hence, we can write the residual balancedness condition as∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) =
∑
T⊆N :n/∈T
(−1)|T |
[
Rf (0T , v−T )−Rf (0T∪{n}, v−(T∪{n}))
]
= 0.
Now, fix a T ⊆ N with n /∈ T and |T | = n − k. Since v is a 0-generic valuation profile,
the rank of agent n in (0T , v−T ) is k. Without loss of generality, we denote (0T , v−T ) ≡ v′.
Note that v′(k) = vn. Using Lemma 3,
Rf (0T , v−T ) =
k−1∑
j=1
jv′(j+1)(pij − pij+1)
and
Rf (0(T∪{n}), v−(T∪{n})) =
k−2∑
j=1
jv′(j+1)(pij − pij+1).
Hence, we can write
Rf (0T , v−T )−Rf (0T∪{n}, v−(T∪{n})) = (k − 1)v′(k)(pik−1 − pik) = (k − 1)vn(pik−1 − pik),
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where the last equality follows because v′(k) = vn. Note that the RHS only depends on the
size of T but not on which elements are present in T . As a result, we can write the residual
balancedness condition as
0 =
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |Rf (0T , v−T ) =
∑
T⊆N :n/∈T
(−1)|T |
[
Rf (0T , v−T )−Rf (0T∪{n}, v−(T∪{n}))
]
=
n∑
k=1
∑
T⊆N :n/∈T,|T |=n−k
(−1)n−k(k − 1)vn(pik−1 − pik)
=
n∑
k=2
(−1)n−kC(n− 1, k − 1)(k − 1)(pik−1 − pik)vn.
The last inequality follows because we can form a subset of size n − k from n − 1 elements
in C(n − 1, k − 1) ways. Now, we simplify this expression to get our desired result. Since
vn > 0, residual balancedness is equivalent to:
0 =
n∑
k=2
(−1)n−kC(n− 1, k − 1)(k − 1)(pik−1 − pik)
=
n∑
k=2
(−1)n−kC(n− 1, k − 1)(k − 1)pik−1 −
n∑
k=2
(−1)n−kC(n− 1, k − 1)(k − 1)pik
= −
n−1∑
`=1
(−1)n−`C(n− 1, `)`pi` −
n∑
`=1
(−1)n−`C(n− 1, `− 1)(`− 1)pi`
= −
n−1∑
`=1
(−1)n−`pi`
[
`C(n− 1, `) + (`− 1)C(n− 1, `− 1)]− (−1)0(n− 1)C(n− 1, n− 1)pin
= −
n−1∑
`=1
(−1)n−`(n− 1)C(n− 1, `− 1)pi` − (−1)0(n− 1)C(n− 1, n− 1)pin
(Here, we used the fact that `C(n− 1, `) + (`− 1)C(n− 1, `− 1) = (n− 1)C(n− 1, `− 1).)
= −
n∑
`=1
(−1)n−`(n− 1)C(n− 1, `− 1)pi`
Since n > 1, we get that residual balancedness is equivalent to
0 =
n∑
`=1
(−1)n−`C(n− 1, `− 1)pi`.
This can be equivalently written as
0 =
n∑
`=1
(−1)`C(n− 1, `− 1)pi`,
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which is the desired claim. 
Proofs of Theorem 1
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 1. We start by characterizing the two-step ranking
allocation rules that can be satisfactorily implemented.
Proposition 5 A two-step ranking allocation rule is satisfactorily implementable if and
only if 2 ≤ ` ≤ n− 1, ` is even, and
pi1 =
C(n− 2, `− 1) + 1
C(n− 2, `− 1) + ` .
Proof : In this and subsequent proofs, we use the following combinatorial fact.
Fact 1 For any r ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
r∑
j=0
(−1)jC(n, j) = (−1)rC(n− 1, r)
and
n∑
j=0
(−1)jC(n, j) = 0.
By Proposition 1, we know that for any two-step ranking allocation rule defined by (pi1, `),
satisfactorily implementability is equivalent to
−pi1 +
∑`
k=2
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)pi2 = 0. (2)
This immediately implies that ` 6= 1. Further, if ` = n, then we must have pi1 =
∑n
k=2(−1)kC(n−
1, k − 1)pi2 = pi2. But, by definition of a two-step allocation rule pi1 > pi2. So, we have
1 < ` < n.
Now, using Fact 1,∑`
k=2
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1) = −
`−1∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k)
= 1−
[ `−1∑
k=0
(−1)kC(n− 1, k)
]
= 1− (−1)`−1C(n− 2, `− 1)
= 1 + (−1)`C(n− 2, `− 1).
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Using this and the fact that pi2 =
1
`−1(1− pi1), we simplify Equation 2 as
−pi1 + 1
`− 1(1− pi1)
(
1 + (−1)`C(n− 2, `− 1)
)
= 0.
For this to hold, we must have ` even and
pi1 =
C(n− 2, `− 1) + 1
C(n− 2, `− 1) + ` .

We now provide a proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof : We do the proof in several steps.
Step 1 - The Primal Problem. In this step, we formulate the problem of finding an
r-optimal allocation rule as a linear program.
Pick  ∈ Rn sufficiently close to the zero vector. Note that  may be the n-dimensional
zero vector or a vector with negative components. We formulate a linear program (in terms
of ) as follows.
max
(pi1,...,pin)
pi1 +
n∑
j=1
jpij
s.t. (LP−RANK)
pii+1 − pii ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
n∑
i=1
(−1)iC(n− 1, i− 1)pii = 0
n∑
i=1
pii = 1
pii ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
By Proposition 1, a feasible solution to the linear program (LP-RANK) is a satisfacto-
rily implementable ranking allocation rule. Note that we have imposed
∑n
i=1 pii = 1 instead
of weak inequality. Since we are interested in finding an r-optimal allocation rule, by Lemma
7, this is without loss of generality. Also, if  is the zero vector, then the optimal solution of
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this linear program will give us an r-optimal allocation rule. We will find an optimal solution
of (LP-RANK) for all  sufficiently close to the zero vector. This will ensure that such an
optimal solution is the unique r-optimal allocation rule.
Step 2 - The Dual Problem We first consider the dual of (LP-RANK) and construct
a dual feasible solution. For formulating the dual, we associate a variable θi for each of the
constraint in the first set of constraints corresponding to i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. We also associate
variables y and z for the second and third constraints respectively.
This leads us to the dual of the linear program (LP-RANK).
min
(y,z,(θ1,...,θn−1))
z
s.t. (DP−RANK)
−θ1 − y + z ≥ 1 + 1
θi−1 − θi + (−1)iC(n− 1, i− 1)y + z ≥ i ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
θn−1 + (−1)ny + z ≥ n
θi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
We construct a dual feasible solution as follows. Set θ1 = 0 and we will choose y and z
such that z − y = 1 + 1. This will imply that the first constraint is automatically satisfied.
The rest of the constraints are satisfied by successively computing θi for i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}.
First, we set
θ2 = θ1 + (−1)2C(n− 1, 1)y + z − 2 = (−1)2C(n− 1, 1)y + z − 2.
Then,
θ3 = θ2 + (−1)3C(n−1, 2)y+ z− 3 =
(
(−1)2C(n−1, 1) + (−1)3C(n−1, 2)
)
y+ 2z− 2− 3.
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Continuing in this manner, we have for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
θi =
( i−1∑
j=1
(−1)j+1C(n− 1, j)
)
y + (i− 1)z −
i∑
j=2
j
= (i− 1)z −
i∑
j=2
j −
( i−1∑
j=1
(−1)jC(n− 1, j)
)
y
= (i− 1)z −
i∑
j=2
j −
(
(−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1)− 1
)
y (Using Fact 1)
= (i− 1)z −
i∑
j=2
j −
(
(−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1)− 1
)
(z − 1)
+ 1
(
(−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1)− 1
)
(Using y = z − 1− 1)
= (1 + 1)
(
(−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1)− 1
)
− z
(
(−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1)− i
)
−
i∑
j=2
j.
This choice of θi ensures that the second set of inequalities in DP-RANK are satisfied.
However, we need to make sure that (a) θis are non-negative and (b) the last inequality is
satisfied. These are ensured by choosing y and z appropriately.
For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, let
H(n, i) := (−1)i−1C(n− 2, i− 1).
First, for non-negativity of θi, we will choose z appropriately. Note that (1 + 1) > 0
since 1 is sufficiently close to zero. Further, θi ≥ 0 if and only if
(1 + 1)
(
H(n, i)− 1
)
− z
(
H(n, i)− i
)
−
i∑
j=2
j ≥ 0. (3)
We consider two cases.
Case a. If i is even, we have H(n, i) = −C(n− 2, i− 1) < 0. Simplifying, we get
z ≥ (1 + 1)
(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + 1
)
(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) + 1(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) i∑
j=2
j
= (1 + 1)
(
1− (i− 1)(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
))+ 1(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) i∑
j=2
j. (4)
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Note that if i = 2, we need
z ≥ (1 + 1)(1− 1
n
) +
1
n
2
Now, choose ` as follows:
` ∈ arg min
n−1≥i≥2,i even
(i− 1)(
C(n− 2, i− 1) + i
) . (5)
Observe that as  is sufficiently close to the zero vector, the second term on the RHS of
Inequality 4 is very small (close to zero) for all i. Hence, this choice of ` maximizes the
RHS of Inequality 4 if (a)  is the zero vector or (b) there is a unique ` that minimizes the
expression in (5) - if there are more than one ` which minimizes the expression in (5), then
the RHS of Inequality (4) is minimized by looking at the second term. By Corollary 1, if
n 6= 8, then there is a unique ` that minimizes the expression in (5). For n = 8, there are
two possible values of ` that minimize this the expression in (5). As a result, which choice
of ` maximizes the RHS of Inequality 4 will depend on the value of  - if  is the zero vector,
then either choice will work.
This implies that for  sufficiently close to the zero vector and n 6= 8, Inequality 4 can be
satisfied by choosing z = z∗, where
z∗ := (1 + 1)
(
1− (`− 1)(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
))+ 1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
) i∑
j=2
j.
For n = 8, choice of z = z∗, where z∗ is defined by choosing any ` that minimizes the
expression in (5), satisfies Inequality 4 if  is the zero vector.
As argued earlier, z∗ ≥ (1 + 1)(1− 1n) + 1n2.
Case b. If i is odd, then H(n, i) = C(n− 2, i− 1). If i = n− 1, then Inequality 3 reduces
to z(n − 2) −∑n−1j=2 j ≥ 0. Since n ≥ 3 and  is sufficiently close to the zero vector, by
choosing z = z∗, it is satisfied. Hence, we assume i < n − 1. In that case H(n, i) ≥ i.
If H(n, i) − i = 0, then the desired Inequality (3) is satisfied for any choice of z since  is
sufficiently close to the zero vector. Assume that H(n, i) > i. Then, Inequality 3 holds if
z ≤ (1 + 1)
(
C(n− 2, i− 1)− 1
)
(
C(n− 2, i− 1)− i
) − 1(
C(n− 2, i− 1)− i
) i∑
j=2
j
= (1 + 1)
(
1 +
(i− 1)(
C(n− 2, i− 1)− i
))− 1(
C(n− 2, i− 1)− i
) i∑
j=2
j.
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Since  is arbitrarily close to the zero vector, by setting z = z∗, this inequality is trivially
satisfied.
Hence, we choose z = z∗, where
z∗ = (1 + 1)
(
1− (`− 1)(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
))+ 1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
) i∑
j=2
j. (6)
Hence, we satisfy the non-negativity constraints by this choice of z. Let y∗ = z∗ − 1 − 1.
Finally, we show that the last inequality in DP-RANK is satisfied. To see this, if n is odd,
then the inequality reduces to
θn−1 − y∗ + z∗ = θn−1 + 1 + 1 ≥ n,
where the inequality follows since we have chosen θn−1 ≥ 0 and  is arbitrarily close to the
zero vector.
If n is even, we note that θn−1 = z(n − 2) −
∑n−1
j=2 j by definition. Then the inequality
reduces to
θn−1 + y∗ + z∗ = z∗(n− 2) + 2z∗ − 1−
n−1∑
j=1
j
= z∗n− 1−
n−1∑
j=1
j
≥ n(1 + 1)(1− 1
n
) + 2 − 1−
n−1∑
j=1
j
= n− 2 + 1(n− 1) + 2 −
n−1∑
j=1
j
≥ n,
where we used the fact that z∗ ≥ (1 + 1)(1− 1n) + 1n2, n ≥ 3, and  is sufficiently close to
the zero vector in the above inequalities.
This completes the proof that there is a feasible solution of (DP-RANK) with z∗ de-
fined by Equation 6.
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Step 3 - Optimality. In this step, we construct a feasible solution of (LP-RANK) by
constructing the probabilities of a two-step ranking allocation rule as follows:
pi∗1 = 1−
`− 1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
) .
pi∗i =
1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
) ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , `}
pi∗i = 0 ∀ i ∈ {`+ 1, . . . , n}.
By construction,
∑
j∈N pi
∗
j = 1 and pi
∗
1 ≥ pi∗i for all i ∈ {2, . . . , `}. By Proposition 5,
(pi∗1, . . . , pi
∗
n) is a feasible solution of (LP-RANK). Further, we see that the objective function
value of (LP-RANK) with this feasible solution is
(1 + 1)
(
1− `− 1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
))+ ∑`
j=2
j
1(
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
) = z∗,
which is the objective function value of (DP-RANK) for the dual feasible solution we found
in Step 2. Hence, by the strong duality theorem of linear programming, (pi∗1, . . . , pi
∗
n) is an
optimal solution of (LP-RANK). For all n ≥ 3, this is an optimal solution when  is the zero
vector. Hence, it describes an r-optimal allocation rule. For n 6= 8, this is an optimal solution
for all  arbitrarily close to the zero vector, and hence, it is the unique optimal solution when
 is equal to the zero vector - this follows from a result by Mangasarian (1979), who showed
that an optimal solution of a linear program is unique if and only if it remains the optimal
solution for sufficiently small perturbation of the objective function. 
Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we provide a proof of individual rationality of a class of two-step ranking
mechanisms. First, we remind the following elementary fact from Myerson (1981).
Fact 2 A mechanism (f,p) is ex-post individually rational if and only if for every i ∈ N
and for every v−i, we have pi(0, v−i) ≤ 0.
Note that the above fact is a necessary and sufficient condition for IR. We now present
two useful lemmas that will help us prove Theorem 2.
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Lemma 4 Suppose f is a satisfactorily implementable two-step ranking allocation rule de-
fined by (pi1, `). Then, for every 0-generic valuation profile v, we have
Rf (v) = (pi1 − pi2)v(2) + `pi2v(`+1),
where pi2 =
1
`−1(1− pi1).
Proof : The proof of the formula forRf follows from the formula derived for any satisfactorily
implementable ranking allocation rule in Lemma 3. 
Notation. For any two positive integers K,K ′ with K ≥ K ′, we denote the consecutive
product of integers from K ′ to K as
ψ(K ′, K) = K ′ × (K ′ + 1)× · · · ×K.
Lemma 5 Suppose (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism, where f is a two-step ranking al-
location rule defined by (pi1, `). Then, for every v with |N0v| = n − K, K ≤ `, and
v1 > . . . > vK > 0, we have for every i ∈ N0v,
pi(v) = − (pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n−K,n− 2)
[K−1∑
j=2
(−1)j(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 1)vj + (−1)K(K − 1)!vK
]
, if K ≥ 2,
and pi(v) = 0 if K ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof : Pick a satisfactory mechanism (f,p), where f is a two-step ranking allocation rule
defined by (pi1, `). Suppose v is such that |N0v| = n−K, K ≤ `. If K = 0, then by symmetry
and budget-balance, we get pi(v) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Else, suppose v1 > . . . > vK > 0. If
K = 1, then, by budget-balance and symmetry we get p1(v)+(n−1)pi(v) = 0 for any i ∈ N0v.
But p1(v) = p1(0, v−1) + v1pi1 − v1pi1 = p1(0, v−1) = 0, where we used revenue equivalence
formula for the first equality and p1(0, v−1) = 0 for the last equality. Hence, we get p1(v) = 0,
and hence, pi(v) = 0 for all i 6= 1. Now, suppose K = 2. Then, budget-balance requires
p1(v) + p2(v) +
∑
i/∈{1,2}
pi(v) = 0.
But using revenue equivalence and the fact that p1(0, v−1) = 0, we get that
p1(v) = p1(0, v−1) + v1pi1 − (v1 − v2)pi1 − v2pi2 = v2(pi1 − pi2).
Similarly, we get p2(v) = p2(0, v−2) + v2pi2 − v2pi2 = 0. Hence, by choosing some i /∈ {1, 2},
we can simplify the budget-balance equation as v2(pi1− pi2) + (n− 2)pi(v) = 0. This implies
that
pi(v) = −(pi1 − pi2)
(n− 2) v2,
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which is the required expression.
Next, suppose K > 2 and use induction. Suppose the claim is true for all k < K. Then,
by revenue equivalence and symmetry we get
∑
j∈N
pj(v) =
∑
j∈N
pj(0, v−j) +Rf (v) = (n−K)pi(v) +
K∑
j=1
pj(0, v−j) +Rf (v),
where i is some agent in N0v. By budget-balance, the above summation is zero, and R
f (v) =
(pi1 − pi2)v2 since K ≤ ` (by Lemma 4). Using this, we get
0 = (n−K)pi(v) +
K∑
j=1
pj(0, v−j) + (pi1 − pi2)v2. (7)
Now, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the profile (0, v−j) has one more zero-valued agent than the
profile v, and hence, we can apply our induction hypothesis. We refer to (0, v−j) for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , K} as a marginal profile having an additional zero-valuation agent than v, and
denote this as vj with the valuation of the k-th ranked agent in this valuation profile denoted
as vj(k). Note that a marginal profile contains (K−1) non-zero valuation agents. Thus, using
our induction hypothesis, Equation 7 can be rewritten as
(n−K)pi(v)
=
K∑
j=1
(pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n−K + 1, n− 2)
[K−2∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)K−1(K − 2)!vj(K−1)
]
− (pi1 − pi2)v2
=
(pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n−K + 1, n− 2)
K∑
j=1
[K−2∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)K−1(K − 2)!vj(K−1)
]
− (pi1 − pi2)v2
We write this equivalently as
ψ(n−K,n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 pi(v) =
K∑
j=1
[K−2∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)K−1(K − 2)!vj(K−1)
]
− ψ(n−K + 1, n− 2)v2. (8)
Now, we remind that v is a valuation profile of the form v1 > v2 > . . . > vK > 0 and vj = 0
for all j > K. We now simplify the RHS of Equation 8 in terms of v1, . . . , vK . To do so,
we explicitly compute the coefficients of vk for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} in the RHS of Equation 8.
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Case 1. Note that v1 does not appear in the summation, and hence, its coefficient is always
zero. Next, v2 = v
j
(2) for all j 6= {1, 2}. Hence, it has a rank 2 in (K − 2) marginal profiles,
and in each such case, its coefficient in the first summation is
(−1)2(1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− 3).
Adding this with −ψ(n−K + 1, n− 2)v2, we get the coefficient of v2 as
(K − 2)ψ(n−K + 1, n− 3)− ψ(n−K + 1, n− 2) = −ψ(n−K,n− 3) = −(−1)2(1!)ψ(n−K,n− 3).
Case 2. Now, consider K > k > 2. Note that vk = v
j
(k′) where k
′ ∈ {k, k−1}. In particular,
k′ = k if j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , K} and k′ = k − 1 if j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Hence, it has rank k in
(K − k) marginal profiles and rank (k − 1) in (k − 1) marginal profiles. When it has rank k
in a marginal profiles, its coefficient in the RHS of Equation 8 is
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1),
and when it has rank (k − 1), its coefficient is
(−1)k−1(k − 2)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k).
Hence, collecting the coefficient of vk, we get
(−1)k(K − k)(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1) + (−1)k−1(k − 1)(k − 2)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k)
= (−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K + 1, n− k − 1)
(
(K − k)− (n− k)
)
= −(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− k − 1).
Case 3. Finally, vK = v
j(k′) where k′ = K − 1 when j ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. Hence, vK has
rank (K−1) in (K−1) marginal profiles. Whenever it has rank (K−1) its coefficient in the
RHS of Equation 8 is (−1)K−1(K − 2)!. Hence, the coefficient of vK in the RHS of Equation
8 is
−(−1)K(K − 1)(K − 2)! = −(−1)K(K − 1)!
Aggregating the findings from all the three cases, we can rewrite Equation 8 as
ψ(n−K,n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 pi(v) =
[K−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− k − 1)vk + (−1)K(K − 1)!vK
]
.
(9)
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This simplifies to the desire expression:
pi(v) = − (pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n−K,n− 2)
[K−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− k − 1)vk + (−1)K(K − 1)!vK
]

Lemma 6 Suppose (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism, where f is a two-step ranking al-
location rule defined by (pi1, `). Then, for every v with |N0v| = n − K, K ≥ ` + 1, and
v1 > . . . > vK > 0, we have for every i ∈ N0v,
pi(v) = − (pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk + (−1)`(`− 1)!v`
]
.
Proof : We follow a similar line of proof as Lemma 5. Consider a valuation profile v with
|N0v| = n−K, K ≥ `+ 1, v1 > . . . > vK > 0 and vj = 0 for all j > K.
We now modify Equation 7 by using Rf (v) = (pi1 − pi2)v2 + `pi2v`+1 (by Lemma 4) as
follows:
0 = (n−K)pi(v) +
K∑
j=1
pj(0, v−j) + (pi1 − pi2)v2 + `pi2v`+1. (10)
Now, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the profile vj has one more zero-valued agent than the
profile v, and hence, we can apply our induction argument - the base case of K = ` is solved
in Lemma 5 where we computed pi(v) with K ≤ ` agents having non-zero valuations. Using
induction hypothesis, we simplify Equation 10 as follows:
−(n−K)pi(v) =
K∑
j=1
− (pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)`(`− 1)!vj(`)
]
+ (pi1 − pi2)v2 + `pi2v`+1.
This can be rewritten as follows:
(n−K)ψ(n− `, n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 pi(v) =
K∑
j=1
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)`(`− 1)!vj(`)
]
− ψ(n− `, n− 2)v2 − `pi2ψ(n− `, n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 v`+1. (11)
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By Proposition 5,
pi1 − pi2 = 1− (`− 1)
C(n− 2, `− 1) + ` −
1
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
=
C(n− 2, `− 1)
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
= C(n− 2, `− 1)pi2
=
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
(`− 1)! pi2. (12)
Hence, Equation 11 can be rewritten as
(n−K)ψ(n− `, n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 pi(v) =
K∑
j=1
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vj(k) + (−1)`(`− 1)!vj(`)
]
− ψ(n− `, n− 2)v2 − `!v`+1 (13)
Like in Lemma 5, we will rewrite the RHS of Equation 14 in terms of v1, . . . , vK .
For this, observe that for any k, vk will appear on the RHS of Equation 14 if there is
some j ∈ {1, . . . , K} and some k′ ∈ {2, . . . , `} such that vj(k′) = vk. Hence, v1 and
v`+2, . . . , vn do not appear on the RHS of Equation 14. We compute the coefficients of
vk for k ∈ {2, . . . , `+ 1}. We consider three cases.
Case 1. For v2, we note that v2 = v
j
(2) for all j 6= {1, 2}. Hence, it has a rank 2 in (K − 2)
marginal profiles, and in each such case, its coefficient in the first summation is
(−1)2(1)!ψ(n− `, n− 3).
Adding this with −ψ(n− `, n− 2), we get the coefficient of v2 in the RHS of Equation 14 as
(K − 2)ψ(n− `, n− 3)− ψ(n− `, n− 2) = −ψ(n− `, n− 3)(n−K)
= −(−1)2(1!)ψ(n− `, n− 3)(n−K).
Case 2. Now, consider 2 < k < `. For vk, note that vk = v
j
(k′) where k
′ ∈ {k, k − 1}. In
particular, k′ = k if j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , K} and k′ = k − 1 if j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Hence, it has
rank k in (K−k) marginal profiles and rank (k−1) in (k−1) marginal profiles. In the RHS
of Equation 14, the coefficient of vk is (−1)k−1(k− 2)!ψ(n− `, n− k) if its rank is k− 1 and
the coefficient is (−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1) if its rank is k. Adding them, we get the
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coefficient of vk in the RHS of Equation 14 as
(−1)k(K − k)(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1) + (−1)k−1(k − 1)(k − 2)!ψ(n− `, n− k)
= (−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)
(
(K − k)− (n− k)
)
= −(−1)k(n−K)(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1).
Case 3. For v`, note that v` = v
j
(k′) where k
′ ∈ {`, ` − 1}. In particular, k′ = ` if
j ∈ {` + 1, . . . , K} and k′ = ` − 1 if j ∈ {1, . . . , ` − 1}. Hence, it has rank ` in (K − `)
marginal profiles and rank (` − 1) in (` − 1) marginal profiles. In the RHS of Equation 14,
the coefficient of v` is (−1)`−1(`− 2)!ψ(n− `, n− `) if its rank is `− 1 and the coefficient is
(−1)`(`−1)! if its rank is `. Adding them, we get the coefficient of v` in the RHS of Equation
14 as
(−1)`−1(`− 1)(`− 2)!ψ(n− `, n− `) + (−1)`(K − `)(`− 1)!
= (−1)`(`− 1)!((K − `)− (n− `))
= −(−1)`(n−K)(`− 1)!
Case 4. Now, consider k = `+ 1. Note that v`+1 = v
j
(k′) if k
′ = ` and j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Hence,
it has a rank ` in ` marginal economies, where its coefficient in the summation of the RHS
of Equation 14 is
(−1)`(`− 1)! = (`− 1)!,
since ` is even. Hence, the coefficient of v`+1 in the RHS of Equation 14 is `(`− 1)!− `! = 0.
Aggregating the findings from all the four cases, we can rewrite Equation 14 as
(n−K)ψ(n− `, n− 2)
pi1 − pi2 pi(v) = −
`−1∑
k=1
(−1)k(n−K)(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)− (−1)`(n−K)(`− 1)!
(14)
This simplifies to the desired expression:
pi(v) = − (pi1 − pi2)
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk + (−1)`(`− 1)!v`
]

With the help of these two lemmas, we can now present the proof of Theorem 2.
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Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof : Consider a two-step allocation rule (pi1, `) such that 2` ≤ n + 1. Proposition 5
characterizes the two-step allocation rules that are satisfactorily implementable. If p is such
that (f,p) is a satisfactory mechanism, then it is ex-post individually rational (by Fact 2) if
and only if for every i ∈ N and for every v, we have pi(0, v−i) ≤ 0.
Fix i ∈ N and choose a profile (0, v−i). By Lemma 2, Rf is continuous in v. Hence,
by the expression of pi(0, v−i) in Theorem 4, pi(0, v−i) is continuous in v−i. Hence, we only
consider v−i such that (0, v−i) is 0-generic. Thus, we can apply Lemma 5 and 6 to compute
pi(0, v−i) and show that it is non-positive.
Suppose v1 > v2 > . . . > vK > 0 and vj = 0 for all j > K. By Lemmas 5 and 6,
pi(0, v−i) ≤ 0 if and only if for every K ≤ `, the following summation is non-negative:[K−1∑
j=2
(−1)j(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 1)vj + (−1)K(K − 1)!vK
]
.
Expanding this, we get
1!ψ(n−K,n− 3)v2 − 2!ψ(n−K,n− 4)v3 + . . .+ (−1)K(K − 1)!ψ(n−K,n−K − 1)vK ,
(15)
where we abused notation to define ψ(n−K,n−K− 1) ≡ 1. Note that if K is even the last
term of Expression 15 is positive. In that case, it is sufficient to show that this summation is
non-negative till K − 1 (i.e., the last negative term in the expression). This idea is captured
by considering the summation till bKco (the largest odd number less than or equal to K).
Hence, we need to show the following expression is non-negative:
bKco∑
j=2
(−1)j(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 1)vj
=
∑
2≤j≤bKco:j even
[
(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 1)vj − (j!)ψ(n−K,n− j − 2)vj+1
]
=
∑
2≤j≤bKco:j even
(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 2)
[
(n− j − 1)vj − jvj+1
]
.
≥
∑
2≤j≤bKco:j even
(j − 1)!ψ(n−K,n− j − 2)(n− 2j − 1)vj.
Note that we are consider a 2-step allocation rule (pi, `) such that 2` ≤ n+ 1. Since K ≤ `,
for every 2 ≤ j ≤ bKco : j even, we have j + 1 ≤ `. Hence, for every 2 ≤ j ≤ bKco : j even,
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we have 2(j + 1) ≤ n + 1 or n − 2j − 1 ≥ 0. This implies that the above expression is
non-negative, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof : Consider a valuation profile v with v1 > v2 > . . . > vn > 0. By Proposition 5,
pi1 − pi2 = 1− (`− 1)
C(n− 2, `− 1) + ` −
1
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
=
C(n− 2, `− 1)
C(n− 2, `− 1) + `
= C(n− 2, `− 1)pi2
=
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
(`− 1)! pi2. (16)
Then, the payments are computed using Lemma 6 as follows.
p1(v) = p1(0, v−1) + v1pi1 −
∫ v1
0
f1(x1, v−1)dx1
= p1(0, v−1) + v1pi1 − (v1 − v2)pi1 − (v2 − v`+1)pi2
= p1(0, v−1) + v2(pi1 − pi2) + v`+1pi2
= − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
− v`+1pi2 + v2(pi1 − pi2) + v`+1pi2
(The above simplification uses Lemma 6 along with Equation 16 and the fact that ` is even.)
= − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
+
ψ(n− `, n− 2)
(`− 1)! v2pi2
= − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=1
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
For every i ∈ {2, . . . , `},
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pi(v) = pi(0, v−i) + vipi2 −
∫ vi
0
fi(xi, v−i)dxi
= pi(0, v−i) + vipi2 − (vi − v`+1)pi2
= pi(0, v−i) + v`+1pi2
= − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ i−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk +
`−1∑
k=i
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
− v`+1pi2 + v`+1pi2
(The above simplification uses Lemma 6 along with Equation 16 and the fact that ` is even.)
= − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ i−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk +
`−1∑
k=i
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk+1
]
For every i > `, we directly use Lemma 6 along with Equation (16) to get
pi(v) = pi(0, v−i) = − pi2
(`− 1)!
[ `−1∑
k=2
(−1)k(k − 1)!ψ(n− `, n− k − 1)vk + (−1)`(`− 1)!v`
]

Proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 3
In this section, we give proofs of Theorem 3 and Proposition 3. We first show that every
r-Pareto optimal allocation rule satisfies the fact that probabilities add up to 1, i.e., the good
is never wasted.
Lemma 7 If f is an r-Pareto optimal or an r-optimal ranking allocation rule with probabil-
ities (pi1, . . . , pin), then ∑
i∈N
pii = 1.
Proof : Suppose f is a ranking allocation rule with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin). Assume for
contradiction f is r-optimal but
∑n
i=1 pii < 1. Let δ = 1 −
∑
i∈N pii > 0. We construct
another ranking allocation rule f ′ with probabilities pi′i ≡ pii + δn for all i ∈ N . Note that
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∑
i∈N pi
′
i = 1 and
n∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)pi′k =
n∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)pik + δ
n
n∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)
=
n∑
k=1
(−1)kC(n− 1, k − 1)pik
= 0,
where the first equality is from the definition of (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n), the second equality follows from
the fact that
∑n
k=1(−1)kC(n−1, k−1) = 0, and the third equality follows from Proposition 1
and the fact that (pi1, . . . , pin) is a satisfactorily implementable ranking allocation rule. Hence,
by Proposition 1, f ′ is satisfactorily implementable. But this contradicts the r-optimality of
f .
Now, suppose f is r-Pareto optimal. The above argument also implies that at every
valuation profile v, we have ∑
i∈N
vif
′
i(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
vifi(v),
with strict inequality holding at almost everywhere. This contradicts the fact that f is r-
Pareto optimal. 
This leads to a simplification of r-Pareto optimality in terms of first-order stochastic-
dominance.
Definition 8 A ranking allocation rule f with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin) first-order stochastic-
dominates (FOSD) a ranking allocation rule f ′ with probabilities (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n) if for every
j ∈ N , we have ∑
i≤j
pii ≥
∑
i≤j
pi′i,
with strict inequality holding at least once. In this case, we write f FOSD f ′.
Lemma 8 Suppose f is a ranking allocation rule with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin) such that it
is satisfactorily implementable. Then, f is r-Pareto optimal if and only if
1.
∑
i∈N pii = 1 and
2. if there exists no ranking allocation rule f ′ with probabilities (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n) such that
• ∑i∈N pi′i = 1,
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• f ′ is satisfactorily implementable, and
• f ′ FOSD f .
Proof : Suppose a ranking rule f with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin) is r-Pareto optimal. By
Lemma 7, we know that
∑
i∈N pii = 1. Now, assume for contradiction that there exists a
ranking allocation rule f ′ with probabilities (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n) such that f ’ is satisfactorily im-
plementable,
∑
i∈N pi
′
i = 1, and f
′ FOSD f . Since f ′ FOSD f , for any profile of generic
valuations v with v1 > v2 > . . . > vn, we have∑
i∈N
vipi
′
i ≥
∑
i∈N
vipii.
The strict inequality must hold for some generic valuation profile by the definition of first-
order stochastic dominance. Now, take any arbitrary valuation profile v. Note that the total
welfare of a ranking allocation rule is continuous in the valuations of the agents. Hence, it
can be written as a limit point of generic valuation profiles like above. This implies that for
every valuation profile v, we have∑
i∈N
vif
′
i(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
vifi(v),
with strict inequality holding for some v. This implies that f is not r-Pareto optimal, a
contradiction.
Now, for the other direction suppose f is a ranking allocation with probabilities (pi1, . . . , pin)
satisfying the properties in the claim. Assume for contradiction that f is not Pareto optimal.
Then, there exists a satisfactorily implementable ranking allocation rule f ′ with probabilities
(pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n) such that for valuation profiles v, we have∑
i∈N
vif
′
i(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
vifi(v),
with strict inequality holding for some v. By Lemma 7, we can assume
∑
i∈N pi
′
i = 1 without
loss of generality. For generic valuation profiles v with v1 > . . . > vn, we have
∑
i∈N vipi
′
i ≥∑
i∈N vipii. As in the previous paragraph, continuity of the total welfare of agents in a ranking
allocation rule implies that f ′ FOSD f . This is a contradiction. 
We now provide a proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.
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Proof : We denote the GL allocation rule as fG. Assume for contradiction that fG is not
r-Pareto optimal. By Lemma 8, there is another ranking allocation rule f such that f is
satisfactorily implementable and f FOSD fG. Suppose the allocation probabilities of f are
(pi1, . . . , pin). We know that the allocation probabilities of f
G are (1 − 1/n, 1/n, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
Since f FOSD fG, pi1 + pi2 = 1, and hence, pi3 = . . . = pin = 0. Since f is satisfactorily
implementable, by Proposition 1, we get
pi1 − (n− 1)pi2 = 0.
Using pi1 + pi2 = 1 and simplifying, we get pi1 = 1 − 1/n. Hence, f is the Green-Laffont
allocation rule, which is a contradiction.
The above proof along with Lemma 7 also makes it clear that among all ranking allocation
rules which allocates probability to only pi1 and pi2, the GL allocation rule is the unique r-
Pareto optimal allocation rule. 
We now provide a proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof : Suppose n ≤ 8. Then, the GL allocation rule is an r-optimal allocation rule by
Corollary 1. Since pi1 + pi2 = 1 in the GL allocation rule, this implies that the GL allocation
rule dominates every other satisfactorily implementable ranking allocation rule an FOSD
sense. By Lemma 8, the GL allocation rule is the unique r-Pareto optimal allocation rule.
Suppose n > 8. Then, Theorem 1 implies that there is a unique r-optimal allocation
rule. Hence, no other satisfactorily implementable ranking allocation rule can dominate this
unique r-optimal allocation rule in an FOSD sense. By Lemma 8, this unique r-optimal
allocation rule is then r-Pareto optimal.
Finally choose an r-Pareto optimal allocation rule (pi1, . . . , pin). By definition of pi
∗
1, we
have pi1 ≤ pi∗1. Further, if pi1 < 1− 1/n, the GL allocation rule dominates this allocation rule
in an FOSD sense, and by Lemma 8, it is not r-Pareto optimal. Hence, pi1 ≥ 1− 1/n. 
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